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A Society of Organizations
Charles Perrow
It is a truism that we live in an organizational society, and that organizations are
important. But it has not been fully appreciated that organizations are more im-
portant than most other units ofanalysis or objects ofanalysis. So, unless you are
an organizational theorist, in the next 40 minutes your specialty will be treated as
a dependent variable; organizations will be the independent variable that shapes
political and economic behavior, the stratification system, religion, social psy-
chological processes and history in general.
My proposition is that organizations are the key to understanding our society
because organizations have absorbed much of society. They have vacuumed up a
good part ofwhat we have always thought ofas society; they were once just one of
the many parts of society; now they contain, control, or have eliminated many
parts of society. No important process goes on in the U.S. that is not caused by,
directed by, or crucially mediated by, organizations.
There are three phenomenon that gave the U.S. a society of organizations:
wage dependency, which made Citizens available for organizations; the external-
ization of the social costs of extensive organized activity, which hid the costs
from Citizens; and the development and spread ofa novel form of bureaucracy,
»factory bureaucracy,« which made controls unobtrasive. Together they led to a
society oforganizations where interactive complexity and tight coupling produce
economic and social crises.
Wage Dependency
Wage dependency means that to survive, one must work for someone eise (and
their profit) and receive compensation in the form ofmoney. It covered about 20
percent ofthe population in 1820, and went to 80 to 90 percent by 1950. In 1820
the seifemployed were mostly farmers; a small segment consisted ofcraftsmen or
small business people; another segment farmed part ofthe time and worked part
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ofthe time for others; and still others moved back and forth between the wage la¬
bor market and subsistence farming or crafts or trades. Lack of permanent wage
dependency in what was, for the early part ofthe 19th Century, a bountiful socie¬
ty, meant a great deal of individual discretion. Even the temporary laborer had
the resources to secure food and fuel through hunting, fishing, a bit offarming,
and woodcutting, and had some time for handicrafts, all ofwhich prevented de¬
pendency upon employers. Permanent wage dependency cut off all alternatives
and made one fully dependent upon employing organizations.
Why the change? The population and its buying power grew quickly because
ofthe abundant resources ofan unexploited continent. This created a large mar¬
ket that in turn required continous feeding. Part time workers, cottage industries,
and the putting out system did not provide reliable production. The most effi-
cient way to feed the market was to require long and steady hours from people
doing highly specialized, easily learned tasks. The steam power and electricity
made the 12 hour day, and year around work close to markets, possible. Immi¬
grants were an ideal labor source, since the self-employed farmers and craftsmen
fiercely resisted the wage dependency offactory work. Immigrants came from de-
pleted societies to a new, abundant one, and 60—70 % percent ofthem stayed on.
Both organizations and the wage dependent population had a steady increase
and produced bountiful goods and enriched the nation, and especially the new
capitalist class. Inequality of wealth in the U.S. grew steadily with wage depen¬
dency in the 19th Century, but the nation as a whole prospered too, heedlessly
consuming the abundant resources and herding the surviving natives into »reser-
vations«. The spread ofthe wage System however, was a fearful change for the so¬
ciety; it was chronicled as »wage slavery«, and then as the »industrial army«; these
were the only institutions people could conceive of that had such control over
people. One might want to escape the idiocy of rural life and the hardships of
farming by going to the city, but going to the city was supposed to mean going in¬
to business for one's seif, learning or working at a craft, joining a business ofa re¬
lative, or temporary wage labor until one could be seif employed. To go into a
factory and be a wage slave was something eise. By the last quarter ofthe Century
it was clear that few could escape wage dependency; by 1950, only about 20 per¬
cent did, a reversal ofthe proportions in 1820.
With wage dependency a bit of society disappeared. A measure of seif suffi-
ciency, the breath of skills that accompanied it, and the cognitive acitvitiy asso-
ciated with it, disappeared. One's role in the polity shrunk, as wage getting be-
came the primary issue. And the traditional Obligation that the farm owner or
master craftsman or the merchant had for the welfare of his »hands« was not a
part ofthe new wage system. A buffer against hard times, accidents and death war
removed. As limited as that Obligation might be, it was perceptible, whereas the
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Obligation under the wage system could be non existent. In fact, with blacklisting,
an expression ofenforced wage dependency, the Obligation was clearly one-way,
from the worker to the employer, and backed up by the State. Since the system
now produced violent business cycles, wage dependency was a very serious con¬
dition.
Externalities
The second important transformation stemmed from the increasing amount of
economic activity controlled by ever larger organizations, and involved the dis-
placement of social costs onto non-owners, principally workers and communi¬
ties. Since the social costs ofactivity are not included in the price ofthe goods or
Services, they are absorbed by non-owners. Two effects followed: first, the exter¬
nalities were so large that they overwhelmed the existing institutions that had ab¬
sorbed them, and thus the viability of churches, neighborhood groups, lodges,
burial societies etc. was weakened, and with it non-organizational society. Sec¬
ond, new organizations were created to cope with the externalities, increasing the
rush to an organizational society, and generating their own externalities.
For example, if pollution costs were internalized, less polluting processes
would be developed to avoid the cost, and then pollution clean-up organizations
would not be needed. If the costs ofworkers sustaining possible unemployment
were internalized through long term employment contracts, the incentive to
avoid overproduction or declining sales would be high enough to promote more
rational planning. As a consequence, the necessity for welfare organizations
would be greatly reduced.
Externalities are present in all economic Systems, but competitive capitalism
is the only one that requires that organizations maximize externalization, and a
weak central government virtually insures it.
Some ofthe externalities that were disguised or neglected by firms were pollu¬
tion, crowded cities, transportation costs once workers could no longer live near
their workplace, industrial accidents, violent business cycles, and the exhaustion
ofeasily available natural resources. New organizations, public and private, rose
ot cope with the damage. We associate the appearance of these organizations
with progress, even prosperity. They ränge from welfare institutions such as pris-
ons and asylums and the related court System to public health departments,
hospitals and associated training institutions, and on the pollution clean up or¬
ganizations concerned with sewage and then toxic wastes, and more intensive
resource extraction organizations as the easily availabe resources were exhausted.
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Much of industrialization is concerned with coping with the problems it gener-
ates; all ofit brings the small, relatively autonomous, loosely coupled social units
into the large organizations or destroys them, and what we still think ofas society
is destroyed with it.
Factory Bureaucracy
I will refer to the third major change as the development of»factory bureaucracy«
to highlight its novelty and the role offactories in developing bureaucracy. After
1920 or so it is so widespread and firmly grounded that bureaucracy, or even just
»Organization« will suffice.
Large scale organizations have been around for centuries, building the pyra-
mids or Venetian ships, establishing religions, fighting wars, administering king-
doms. Some had a core ofpermanent employees, that is wage dependent individ-
uals, or were total institutions such as the Catholic Church. But only with indus¬
trialization, and initially with the factory, did the elements fo factory bureaucracy
come together in a large number oforganizations, enough ofthem for the organiza¬
tional pattern to be readily and easily adopted by new organizations in the
growing economy.
The principal problem for entrepreneurs and capitalists producing goods
and Services was continous, predictabel production. If the work force had to
work for someone eise in order to eat, they would show up for work. But to get
them to work hard, and to do exactly what they are told, centralized control is re-
quired. The putting out system, craft production, inside contracting and other
devices did not provide centralized control such that one person at the top could
reach directly into all processes. Factory bureaucracy established centralized
control where all processes were either brought together under one roof or
otherwise controlled by the owner. Since production was complex, central-
ization also meant that hierarchy had to be established, making it quite clear to
whom each person in turn reported, by establishing hierarchy as a principle,
persons such as foremen or Supervisors filled roles or job slots that were indepen-
dent ofthe person, and obedience was given to the position, an aspect offormal-
ization.
Formalization meant establishing not only hierarchical chains, but Standard
operating procedures and rales and regulations. When fully implemented (it
took F. W. Taylor to see the need for füll implementation) it meant that superiors
would know what skills the subordinate used (the better to control him or her),
could control and change those skills as needed, and subdivide the work so that
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wages could be closely matched to the level ofskill, thus paying each category the
minimum possible. Finally, standardization and specialization of as many tasks as
possible was necessary. Standardizing tasks reduced the necessary training
time, and simplified the work so that more people would be qualified for the job,
lowering employee power. (It also probably meant more even quality levels, and
even lower materials costs.) Specialization could take place once tasks were stand-
ardized, raising output. Specialization is normally thought to mean raising skill
levels, and it can mean that. But it can also mean narrowing them, or what came
be called »deskilling«. The growth ofbureaucracy entailed both skilling and de-
skilling.
These elements, which constitute the definition ofthe modern form of bu¬
reaucracy
— centralization, hierarchy, formalization, standardization and spezia-
lization — were only gradually introduced. There was Opposition ot bureaucracy,
just as there was to wage slavery. One ofthe biggest impediments to füll bureauc-
ratization during much ofthe 19th Century was the inside contracting system. It
was used in the most technologically advanced and most mass production indu¬
stries, and it delayed the appearance offüll fledged bureaucracy in these organiza¬
tions. In this system the owner provided the building, supplies and power source,
and major pieces ofmachinery, and the contractor hired, fired, paid, and directed
the work ofhis crew, which could be as large as 100. He worked on the basis of
annual contracts for so many trigger assemblies, rifle Stocks, sewing machine
treadles or whatever.
Inside contracting, though very efficient and responsible for continuous in-
novations, violated most of the emerging principals of bureaucracy to at least
some extent. The hierarchy was truncated, because the inside contractor hired his
own workers and the owner had no control over them. The shortened hierarchy
meant that centralized control was limited. Formalization, standardization, and spe¬
cialization were all limited since the contractor could set his own production
rales, etc. Of course, he was bound by the contract to deliver a certain number
and quality ofrifle barreis or sewing machine chains or whatever, and the delivery
date was formalized, but this concerned his contract with the owner, not with his
own employees.
The system ws remarkably efficient since it was in the interests ofthe contrac¬
tor to innovate, and the owner did not incur the many »transaction costs« of
hiring, paying, and especially, supervising workers. But it also spread the wealth,
and some ofthe contractors made as much as the owners did. And it also fostered
group loyalty since contractors utilized personalistic bases of hiring, and offen
Hved with or close to their workers. In fact, this highly decentralized, profit
sharing, »human relations« oriented System is being rediscovered today. It dis¬
appeared in the late 19th Century because the profits ofthe contractors could be
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appropriated by owners if contractors became foremen, and because it fostered
too much labor solidarity.
Bureaucracy means efficiency for most organizational theorists, but for me
it means primarily an unobtrusive control device of unprecedented power, so
efficient and effective that it could supplant many of the controls that had no
workplace sources, removing them from non organizational society. »Habits
ofthe heart« were being installed, offen at the age of 10 or 12; certainly by 16,
and then 18 later in this Century. Bureaucracy offered elites an assist that gave
them unprecedented control over the society, given the scope and complexity
ofthat society, since it provided such exquisite control over the institutions that
were absorbing society — the bureaucracies. For owners in the private sector and
managers in the public and non profit sectors, indirect and unobtrusive controls
are far less costly than direct controls, where Orders have to be given and Per¬
formance observed. Factory bureaucracy replaced direct controls with rales and
procedures, which are always in existence and quite impersonal with machinery,
which in essence is a bündle ofrules built into a machine (recall that workers were
brought into factories for surveillance and for long work hours; the machinery
came later to make use ofthis convenient agglomeration ofhands); bureaucracy
delegated any necessary surveillance to lower levels in the hierarchy; and it
standardized inputs and Outputs as much as possible to reduce the need for many
controls. The result was a much more impersonal and remote control system,
and a vastly more effective one. It served to legitimize factory bureaucracy in
society, since it was a vast improvement over direct controls. But since so much
of one's daily time and indeed, ones fate now lay with the Organization, the so¬
ciety outside of the Organization had to prepare and socialize its members for
these bureaucratic structures. Citizenship came to emphasize punctuality,
obedience, respect, patience in service to another and patience about moving
up, and the necessary literacy and numerical skills. The unobtrusive controls
of society that were irrelevant to the workplace, to the Organization, such as
reciprocity, ethnie and religious culture, and the extended family, withered in
importance.
The importance offactory bureaucracy can be seen in its swift adoption by al-
most all organizations in the U.S. in the latter part ofthe 19th Century and into
the first third ofthe next Century. Schools, Colleges, hospitals, prisons, State and
private welfare agencies, foundations, voluntary associations ofall types and gov-
ernment itself »bureaucratized«. Reformers and organizational founders alike
hailed the industrial Organization model
— factories, by and large — as the impor¬
tant social innovation ofthe time. And it truly was. As MaxWeber put it, all eise
is dilettantism, and he cited speed, precision, calculation, predietability, imper-
sonality and aecountability as its virtues.
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An unexamined and uncritical conclusion ofMax Weberand his contempo-
raries, and for the vast majority ofsocial scientists today, was that the onlyway to
achieve these efficiencies was through factory bureaucracy. But industrialization
could have taken place under the more flexible and equitable inside contracting
system; the craft system could have been preserved rather than destroyed; and
different principles ofOrganization could have survived that emphasized decen-
tralization of control, profit sharing, Output control rather than control by rales
and regulations or direct controls, and so on. In fact, U.S. industry was at a sort of
crossroads after the Civil War, and could have institutionalized the more decen-
tralized form that existed, mobilizing self-regarding rather than other-regarding
forms ofbehavior. (According to Piore and Säbel the decentralized form did per-
sist in parts ofEurope and has been the basis for a resurgence in productivity and
community-wide welfare provisions.)
Or, the U.S. could have followed the route that Lenin and his successors in
the U.S.S.R. took, where Taylorism was installed with a vengeance and later ex-
tended to the satellite countries. This involved a degree of centralization and
deskilling that was attempted in the U.S., but was (1) resisted by labor, (2) resisted
by the communiy, and (3) was less necessary for the profits of owners given the
abundant natural wealth and Strategie location ofthe U.S. in the 19th and early
20th Century. The form of factory bureaucracy adopted in the U.S. was, then, a
middle ground; both the more »liberal« and the more reactionary paths were pos¬
sible and were taken by others.
Of course, this argument rans counter to most respected interpretations,
which cite efficiency as the reason for bureaucracy, as in Chandler, and even mas¬
sive conglomerates, as in Williamson. They have a very narrow definition ofeffi¬
ciency and no definition of externalities, however. I argue that market control
and profits are far more important as motives than efficiency, and are consistent
with the economic theory of capitalism, which recognizes profits as the driving
force, not productivity and certainly not social efficiency.
Some examples of my reinterpretation of the dynamics of our industrial
history will illustrate my point: Child labor was widespread when it was
profitable for owners; when the technology and type of work changed, it
declined, and only after it's decline was it outlawed by reformers. Wage cuts
were not just a response to narrowing profit margins or competition since they
oecurred when the companies were having banner years and by those with exten¬
sive market control. Wage rates were a matter of class-wide diseipline or maxi¬
mum profits, not just economic survival and competition. For the great majority
of the few firms that established them, Company welfare programs appeared in
times of labor shortage and were abandoned at the first sign of labor surplus;
this suggests that nothing but obtaining sufficient labor at the lowest cost was
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involved, despite the rationalizations that owners offered and current researchers
accept.
The externality ofindustrial accidents was addressed in a fashion, under pres¬
sure, and with a distinctively bureaucratic Solution: Workman's compensation
was enacted because the contingent fee system allowed lawyers to represent poor
workers, and the law suits being won were beginning to cost industry dearly. The
Solution was to set up a bureaucracy to adjudicate cases and control the benefits.
Benefits were set at a minimal level, far below those awarded in courts to individ-
uals, all firms were taxed, thus spreading the resulting price increase extremely
widely, and effectively minimizing the incentive ofthe individual firm to follow
safe practices. The conservative A.F. ofL. union supported workman's compen¬
sation, but most other unions saw its implications and opposed it.
Deskilling was widespread, not in a static technical sense ofcomparing Jobs in
1880 with those in 1980, for example, but in terms ofthe relative skill level ofthe
society at each point in time. Today it may require more skill to drive to work
than to carry out the tasks at work for a third or more ofour workforce; this was
not true in the 19th Century. According to some analyses the average employee
today has two more years ofschooling than is required by the job, and most Jobs
require only an eight grade education or less. In relative terms, the only terms that
count in a society where education and cognitive skills have expanded rapidly, we
have a deskilled society as compared to the first half ofthe 19th Century.
(My point ist not that the 19th Century was a preferable society at all; life was
nastier, more brutish and rather short. My point is first that generally speaking,
the history ofindustrialization, as written, has notheen one ofwage dependency,
externalities, the control consequences ofbureaucracy, and the alternative paths
that might have been taken, for better or worse. Instead, the history ofindustriali¬
zation has been relentlessly functionalist, assuming linear development, con-
cerned with narrow efficiency and Output, and celebratory. I believe a focus upon
organizations will redress that deficiency.
The cost to our society in wealth and income increased markedly up to about
the turn of the Century. Thus, while life for all improves, life for the poor im¬
proved far less. Inequality of wealth stabilized at the end of the Century, but
remained high; to this day, it is the highest of all industrialized nations except, I
believe, France and South Africa, despite 80 years of social movements and
progressive legislation. The increase in the Standard ofliving is hardly a matter of
celebration since it was based in considerable part on the rapid consumption of
the vast natural resources available in the new land, the increased hours oflabor
ofthe wage dependent citizenry, the geographical mobility oflabor, and the con-
centration of wealth that, along with foreign Investments, provided the invest¬
ment capital and thus reaped most of the returns.
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In fact, it was necessary for the Standard ofliving to rise because it had to com-
pensate for the new degradations and the new necessities that industrialization
and bureaucracy required, such as more health facilities because of more acci-
dents and pollution, or better transportation because people could no longer live
close to their source oflivlihood. The most important change in the Standard of
living was better nutrition, and industrialization's contribution to better nutri-
tion was rather indirect — improved transportation and refrigeration. Most ofin¬
dustrialization's triumphs were concerned with itself, concerned with the fouling
ofits own nest. The triumphs were concerned with such things as facilitating the
growth ofthe organizations that industrialization needed by moving people and
goods about more quickly and to more distant places, by enabling more crowded
cities to appear and survive so that organizational efficiency could be higher, and
with the improvement of weapons and warriors for acquiring territory and
protecting overseas markets. A society of organizations began to appear when
feeding the organizations and cleaning up after them became the criteria for effi¬
ciency, productivity, and progress.)
Complexity and Coupling
Between 1820 and 1900 the U.S. went from a very loosely coupled system to a
moderately coupled one; by 1950 it was tightly coupled, and by 1988, perhaps
dangerously so. In 1820 the interactions between communities, and between the
few organizations ofany consequence were, by and large, visible, predictable and
could be anticipated. By 1900 the number and size of organizations had grown
substantially, as had the communities, and unexpected interaction were beginning
to appear, as in the panic of 1893. One result ofthe coordination problem for the
large organizations were the industrial trasts and combinations, and then the
multidivisional form, and finally, by 1950, the first conglomerates — it was the
Organization of organizations, with business and trade associations, and govern-
ment bureaucracies trying to manage the interdependencies. The power ofindi¬
vidual capitalists, families, and alliances peaked about 1920; their control over
government and communities was unprecedented. But internal divisions and
contradiction within business and industry made control of the expanding
economy more and more difficult, and the tycoons faded. Nevertheless, their
organizational empires continued to grow, bumping into each other, merging
and dissolving, increasingly reacting to organizational rather than class or family
dynamics.
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As the new system took form we developed devices to buffer, control or try to
decouple the increasingly mysterious interactions, such as the federal reserve
system, occasional price and wage controls, unemployment insurance, social se-
curity, planning Councils, deficit spending, etc.
The federal government, labor and communities presented somewhat suc-
cessful challenges to the hegemony ofthe large financial, industrial and business
bureaucracies. The degree ofinequality ofwealth in society no longer increased,
but was stabilized. But it took the progressive movement, the New Deal, the
union movement, progressive taxation, and the civil rights movement to just
maintain that degree inequality, one ofthe highest among industrialized nations,
and it is has recently risen. Meanwhile the inffastructure ofsociety formed to sup¬
port the system ofwage dependency, externalities, and factory bureaucracy, but it
was an organizational infrastructure, drawing more power and function out
ofwhat was once considered society and putting it into large educational, recrea-
tional, medical, government and social Service bureaucracies. Wage dependency
soared; the independent professions became bureaucratized; school system
centralized; social work targeted the intrapsychic problems of the non poor;
medicine transformed the hospices and withdrew into them; imperial business
created the city manager movement; credentialing and bureaucratizing symbol-
ized the infrastructure.
What was the society that was now being contained within large employing
organizations or their small satellites? A füll Service one, where up to 45 percent
of your earnings pay for Services
— fringe benefits — that you may or may not
want, and are designed and controlled byyour masters, and only 65 percent is left
for you to ffeely spend.
I think it makes a difference in the relative strength ofsociety as opposed to or¬
ganizations ifthe Organization is the source ofthe following social functions, or
the arbiter of their availability: psychotherapy and counseling, educational op-
portunities, sex therapy, days off for a Christmas Shopping, tax and investment
advice, sports facilities, comprehensive medical care, maternal and paternal
medical leave, vacation planning and vacation resorts, travel Services, relocation
Services, formal training programs, retirement counseling and planning, religious
facilities and funeral Services, and if you are really lucky, even child care.
We applaud these; we count as a progressive employer the firm or university
that supplies our needs through these Services (some of them tax-avoiding de¬
vices that are thus financed by the less fortunate employees in marginal organiza¬
tions). But they shape our behavior and our consciousness in unobtrusive ways,
taking a bit ofchoice that once was outside ofthe employment contract and put¬
ting it into that context. Our choice is less subject to family and kin, neighbors,
peer groups, or religious or ethnie ties, the society ofthe past. It may even be a
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compassionate organizational gesture, but we have to depend more and more on
large employing organizations for our compassions, ifwe are lucky enough to be
in one, not from what was once considered a society we helped construct.
I know, my long list of Services that the enlightened empolyer provides was
poorly performed in 1820, ifat all. But most ofthese Services now exist to redress
externalities that hardly existed then, and with the wealth ofthis nation we might
expect these and more Services to now be available as a rigth ofcitizenship, rather
than as condition of employment at a progressive Organization, and controlled
by that Organization.
There is an additional consequence in having such Services as these perfor¬
med or offered on contract bases by employers, rather than independent groups.
With the absorption of society goes the increasingly unmanageable interdepen-
dencies between large, encompassing organizations. For example, the interde¬
pendence oflarge organizations is increased such that the insurance providers be-
come dependent upon employee medical benefit contracts, and favor them; and
the employer becomes dependent upon the insurance providers, who, not inci-
dently, may invest their funds in the employers firm; and both become interested
in government actions in the benefit area, say medicare; and indeed, in the hospi-
tals and other medical facilities, an interest shared by the government also; and
we might mention the possibility of a large labor union being involved also,
though only 17 percent of workers now belong to one, and more tangentially,
professional groups such as the American Medical Association; and when some-
thing like AIDS enters the picture, so does the Surgeon General, the National In¬
stitutes of Health, political candidates, gay groups, the moral majority schools
and so on.
Elsewhere I have argued that interactively complex Systems are prone to
system failures, and if they are also tightly coupled, recovery is limited. I was
dealing with such things as nuclear plants, chemical plants, air transport and the
like. There is some evidence ofinteractive complexity and tight coupling at work
in our social and economic Systems as well: I am analyzing the AIDS crisis as a
system failure due to the unexpected interactions ofmultiple failures; the Octo-
ber 1987 stock market crash is a good example offailures in a system more tightly
coupled than anyone thought; the deindustrialization ofthe U.S. can be seen as a
failure to maintain small, flexible units ofproduction with loyalities to crafts and
location superceding loyalty to and dependence upon the large employing
Organization; the threat ofa world wide economic panic, unfortunately increas¬
ingly being managed by making ever tighter links and more elaborate bureaucra-
tic rules, could be another.
I don't see any evolving Solutions to managing the increased complexity and
coupling ofour nation, and its links to the rest ofthe world. It is true that there is a
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renewed interest in decentralization, empowering local units, debureaucratiza-
tion, flexible production, group autonomy and group integrity. But all these
wonderful goals have been on our agendas in the U.S. for decades, even genera-
tions, but nothing much seems to change. It may even be that we are not bureauc-
ratized enough, and the corporatism ofEurope is preferable to the U.S. variety of
capitalism, but I am only beginning to examine the comparative dimensions of
the absorption of society by organizations.
To conclude, there are several important sources of our present maladies.
Technological change is an important precondition for the dynamics I have de-
scribed, once we had wage pendency and factories. Certainly our form ofcapital¬
ism is a part ofthe explanation; the U.S. has the most virulent form ofseifinterest
maximizing capitalism in the West. The formation of modern social classes,
attendant upon capitalism, the weakness ofthe central State, and the penalties of
race and gender are all important. But I have tried to focus on what I think is the
most important factor, the extraordinary success ofa major unobtrusive control
device, bureaucracy. This form ofOrganization is, I believe, at the root ofour suc¬
cess and of our perils. Coming from an organizational theorist, my conclusion
should surprise no one.
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